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REBROADCASTRIGHTS
By Harlan R. Schreiber

orty years ago, television programs offered a simpler view of the
world. Ward taught Wally and the Beaver lessons of life, and Ralph
and Alice Kramden were a relatively happy couple. All was well with the world.
Indeed, the television industry itself was similarly uncomplicated. Networks gave
programs to affiliates who in turn gave viewers access to the programs. Much like
the more complicated family lives of today, however, the relationship between the
networks and affiliates is no longer as simple and familiar as it was in the 1950s.
Due to technological changes, their once-symbiotic relationship now has turned into
an ongoing war. The networks' battle plan is to minimize affiliates' role in providing network programming. Their first salvo has been an attempt to

The
Com ing

reach viewers via cable in addition to their over-the-air
broadcasts.

The affiliates, in turn, have

Battle in the
War Between the
Networks and the Affiliates

tried vigilantly to preserve their
traditional role as the
networks'

principal programming disseminaThe latest battle in this war
tor.
takes place on the minefield of network cable rebroadcasts of primetime programs.
In March 1997, MSNBC, an NBC
cable television station, began re-airing Dateline NBC, one of NBC's
prime time programs. This cable
rebroadcast strained the relations
between NBC and its affiliates. The
affiliates maintain that the re-airing
of the Dateline NBC and other programming violates the exclusivity
clauses that they have been granted
by NBC for prime time programming. Indeed, the controversy over
the exclusive right to broadcast network programming is not limited to
NBC. ABC, CBS, and FOX all have
entered into the cable market, and
their affiliates have expressed similar concerns over the how cable networks might infringe on the viewership of local affiliates.
The network-affiliate dispute did
not begin with rebroadcasting.
Rather, it is only the newest growing
pain in the evolving television industry. As cable has entered American
homes, the networks have begun to
examine alternative methods of distribution, which would minimize the
affiliates' role in providing programming to viewers. The resulting clash
will establish each side's role and
bargaining power in defining future
industry changes. Because this tension ultimately will be resolved in
negotiation, it is important that the

how networks and affiliates are
attempting to redefine their roles in
the television industry.
The first section will address the
history of networks and affiliates and
have
their relationships
how
changed as technology has advanced.
The second section will then place
the present controversy regarding
cable rebroadcasts within the framework of the larger industry. It will
also address how the present controversy could be resolved in negotiation, litigation, or settlement. The
third and fourth sections will examine respectively the viability of the
parties' legal claims and remedies.
Finally, this Note will draw conclusions based on the direction the television industry is moving and how
such trends affect the parties' strategy in the present controversy.

TIES OF TRADITION:
NETWORKS AND AFFILIATES

The three major television networks are NBC, CBS, and ABC.' All
three operate similarly, supplying
programming with the goal of providing their products to the most possible viewers. A large audience will
encourage sponsors to invest in the
network's programming. In order to
disseminate its product to as many
viewers as possible, the networks
contract with local affiliates, which
broadcast the programs to specific
regions. The local stations, in turn,
need programming to fill their schedules, which the networks supply.
In a typical network-affiliate
parties guard their rights and exercise
all the bargaining power now available. agreement, the network provides the
This Note will analyze the present affiliate with a schedule of programs
rebroadcast dispute, examining the and commercials, compensating the
2
legal and practical issues that will affiliate for the airtime it allocates.
arise and recommend how the par- The affiliate may run the programs
ties should proceed in the controver- as it chooses, subject to contractual
sy. The analysis will place this con- guarantees. If the affiliate chooses
troversy within the larger context of not to air a particular show, however,

another station in the market may
gain access to it. 3 If the affiliate does
air the network's program, the network pays a fee based primarily upon
the strength of the specific affiliate
and the size of the market. 4 The payment comprises a small amount of a
large affiliate's revenues but can
make up to 30 percent of a smaller
affiliate's revenue. 5 In return for the
programs and fees from the networks, the affiliate retains only a
limited amount of local airtime.
Each of the major networks has
approximately 200 affiliates nationwide. In order to guarantee airtime,
the networks own the affiliates in a
few of the major markets, such as
New York and Los Angeles. The
majority of affiliates are independent
stations that have established relationships with their network since as
early as the 1950s. Affiliates rarely
change the network with which they
have contracted 6-although this has
changed somewhat in the last ten
years with the emergence of new networks, such as FOX, WB, and UPN.
These new networks have provided
affiliates with alternatives in contract negotiations, but they have not
significantly altered the senior networks' affiliate rosters because their
programming is not popular enough
to prompt audience shifts. Since the
affiliates have little other recourse,
their bargaining power against the
networks is limited.
Traditionally, network-affiliate
agreements lasted an average of two
years. This changed in 1994 when
some CBS affiliates defected to FOX
because the National Football
League transferred its broadcasting
rights from CBS to FOX. 7 The affiliates profited from the flexibility
inherent in short-term contracts, as
they were able to shift networks to
access desired sporting events and

other valuable programming. CBS,
meanwhile, was left to scramble for
new affiliates. In an effort to combat
this affiliate freedom, networks have
changed their affiliate agreements to
8
run generally from five to ten years.

CABLE INVASION
In the days of The Honeymooners,
the networks were the only source of
programming. By the 1980s, however, cable television emerged as a
major competitor for viewers. 9 Cable
television's strength in diverting
viewers from network television
rests in its ability to offer many single-themed channels. While a network offers news, movies,
sports, sitcoms, and dramas,
L
most cable channels focus

channels.
ABC, for example, has
purchased ESPN, Lifetime, and A &
E. Generally, networks have not
used their formidable name recognition or programming to boost their
cable channels' ratings. As always,
viewers were drawn to these cable
channels for their single-themed programming, not because the viewer
might identify the cable channel with
the network that owns it.

THE TELEVISION
INDUSTRY EVOLVES
In response to the growth of cable,
the networks have tried to redefine
their traditional position. In 1992,

viewers splitting their loyalty
between the affiliate and the cable
stations. 15 Furthermore, the network signal disseminated by the
affiliates contained advertisements
for the triple-cast, thus forcing the
affiliates to promote a product against
which they were competing. The affiliates' fears about the triple-cast were
not realized, as the triple-cast was not
well received by viewers-it lost $100
million. 16 Still, the triple-cast was
significant because it represented the
first network offensive to
diminish the
affiliates'
involvement in disseminating programs to viewers.
Indeed, networks have only
expanded their campaign on
the cable market since the
failure of the triple-cast.
Recently, the networks

A

on only certain content. 10
ESPN is solely dedicated to
sports, for example, CNN to
news, and HBO to movies.
Provided viewers are interested in their themes, cable
channels are guaranteed a
favorable market share in
their given niche because
viewers can depend on
consistent,
tailor-made
programming.
Network television has
lost a significant number of viewers
and a parallel amount of advertising
revenue as a result of cable television.
Network television's prime
time ratings share has dropped
steadily from 93 percent in 1977 to
61 percent in 1996.11 Correspondingly, the percentage of total television advertising revenues spent on
network television also has dropped,
from 60 percent in 1979 to 30 percent
in 1997.12 In an effort to recapture
this lost market share, networks
have entered the cable television
business. The networks began by
purchasing previously existing cable

cast in an attempt to lure subscribers. 14 The affiliates were outraged by the triple-cast, fearing that
their audience would be diluted by

have created their own
cable stations that bear

NBC made the first network endeavor to reshape network-affiliate roles.
NBC owned the right to broadcast
the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in
Barcelona, Spain. Instead of offering
the traditional range of events to its
affiliates, NBC launched a "triplecast." For the triple-cast, NBC aired
some events on its affiliates and created three pay-per-view cable channels to air uninterrupted coverage
from 5 a.m. to 5 p.m. 13 Though the
affiliates were given the same quantity of coverage as in years past, NBC
reserved some of its most attractive
events, like basketball, for the triple-

their names and logos. In
1992, NBC bought the FNN
channel, which it converted
to CNBC. Since its inception, CNBC has been used
simply to provide public information,
much like C-SPAN. In 1996, however, NBC launched MSNBC and CBS
created CBS Eye on People, both of
which were designed to supplement
17
the existing network channels.
The networks use their name recognition and extensive resources to promote these cable channels, sharing
recognized
anchorpersons
and
reporters across the channels. Dave
Keneipp, Vice President of Legal
Affairs for FOX Television, comments that "[NBC news personalities] cross over all the time. Jane
Pauley has Dateline and [Tom]

18
Brokaw hops over."
These network cable channels are
primarily, but not entirely, newsThey are a
themed channels.
response to the current trend of viewers flocking to news-themed stations
when news breaks. 19 In fact, network nightly news viewership has
dropped 22 percent in the last five
years while cable news channels'
viewership has risen. 20 This phenomenon may occur for two reasons.
First, the viewers can be assured
of immediate coverage on the cable
channel because news is that channel's primary goal. Second, the cable
channel may occupy such a strong
niche as a news provider that viewers now reflexively tune into the station for all their news. Cable news
channels have enjoyed much higher
ratings than the networks when covering breaking news stories such as
the chase of O.J. Simpson, the death
of Princess Diana, and the Monica
This trend
Lewinsky scandal. 2 1

"WHAT IS GOOD FOR
THE NETWORK IS GOOD
FOR THE AFFILIATES"
Currently, rebroadcasts are limited mostly to news magazines, as networks attempt to regain their lost
market share of the news. MSNBC's
recent excursion into rebroadcasting
late-night programming, however,
may mark a significant change in the
use of network cable channels
because entertainment programming
has held stronger with network viewers. Network cable channels may
shift their focus from supplementing
the networks' low-rating news coverage to instead focusing on the
dependable entertainment shows
that are the lifeblood of the affiliates.
Indeed, NBC may have manifested
this intent when it began rebroadcasting Late Night with Conan
O'Brien. If network cable channels
engage in widespread rebroadcasting
of entertainment shows, it will significantly change broadcast television by redefining the roles of net-

spurred the networks to enter the
Michelle Dube, works and affiliates.
cable news fray.
While networks and affiliates
Programming Director of WKRN in
Nashville, Tennessee, notes that have long worked together to reach
"broadcasters lose viewers to cable as many viewers as possible, the end
every year, [so entering] cable allows result of a network venture into
22
entertainment rebroadcasting could
them to recapture viewers."
Although these network cable create a network conglomerate of
channels are available for news 24 multiple, independent channels. The
hours a day, they generally do not purpose of this arrangement would
provide reporting around the clock. be to capture as many viewers as
CNBC and MSNBC have offered talk possible for the overall entity. The
shows such as Rivera Live as well as distribution of viewers within the
a video-recorded rebroadcast of the conglomerate would not matter to
Don Imus Radio Show. NBC has the network, which would target only
also used the cable channels to the aggregate viewership of all its
rebroadcast some network program- channels. In such a framework, the
ming, including reruns of Late affiliates' specific viewership could
Night with Conan O'Brien and diminish greatly or disappear entireDiscussing whether network
Dateline NBC.2 3 To date, there ly.
have been few network cable cable rebroadcasts posed a threat to
rebroadcasts, so affiliate ratings affiliates, Michael Gartner, former
president of NBC, maintains that
have not yet markedly suffered.

"network cable allows NBC to get
more viewers and that is good for the
network. ... What is good for the net24
work is good for the affiliates."
But this is not always the case.
Despite assertions by the networks to the contrary, network and
affiliate interests diverge on the
Rebroadissue of rebroadcasting.
casting, like the triple-cast and network cable, represents another step
towards phasing affiliates out of the
television industry. While the elimination of affiliates may not be imminent, rebroadcasting is a first step in
that direction because it demonstrates that viewers may be drawn to
cable instead of the affiliates. In
response to networks' motivations for
rebroadcasting, Jim Waterbury, former president of NBC's networkaffiliate relations board and General
Manager of KWWL in Waterloo,
Iowa, notes that "networks are
always trying to find ways to change
their partnership status with their
affiliates." 2 5 It is this attitude that
pervades the issue of cable rebroadcasting. While triple-cast was a failure, rebroadcasting on cable net26
works may not be.

INDUSTRY WEAKNESS,
BARGAINING STRENGTH
In order to resolve the issue of
cable rebroadcasts, the affiliates
must specifically delineate their complaints. The affiliates protest that
rebroadcasts of network programs
will erode their viewership because
viewers will no longer rely on them
for network programming. 27 While
rebroadcasts have been isolated
enough that no significant erosion
has yet occurred, the affiliates should
not wait until rebroadcasts become
an industry standard. Some affiliates are particularly bothered by the
cable rebroadcasts because they

interpret their affiliate agreements
to grant them exclusive rights to the
network programming within their
28
broadcast areas.
The outcome of this dispute will be
affected largely by the network's relative strength of bargaining position.
Jim Waterbury states that "[the network] owns more affiliates now and
now has greater leverage on the affiliates [in negotiations]. '' 29 Network
executives agree with this position as
well. Dave Keneipp of FOX points
out, "There is not a lot of negotiating
leverage on the part of the affiliates.
...The affiliates can do little to
change their situation." 30 This point
is further supported by FOX's network-affiliate form contract, which
makes no mention of affiliate exclusivity. 3 1 The form agreement demonstrates the strength that networks
hold over the affiliates in bargaining.
But the affiliates are not without
bargaining power. Industry executives are quick to note that the network still needs affiliates to reach
the largest possible television audience. Dave Keneipp notes that no
broadcast medium can "reach 100
percent of the country the way the
over-the-air television does." 32 Jim
Waterbury further explains that
"there are only a limited number of
VHF stations in the country, and
they are the only free [non-cable] television stations in the country." 33 In
addition to the limited number of
stations,
televisions
broadcast
Keneipp says, "The highest cable
penetration in any market in the
country is still no greater than about
low 70, maybe 75 percent. ... That's
still 25 percent of the audience [with
no viewing alternative but broadcast
television]."'3 4 The affiliates' status
as the only television providers in
certain markets gives them enough
leverage to conduct meaningful nego-

tiations with the network. However,
network television loses more and
more viewers to cable each year.
This loss of viewership, as cable
expands into more rural markets,
continually undercuts the affiliates'
status in bargaining. The affiliates
need to assert more than their everdwindling status as broadcast television stations to negotiate effectively
with the network.
The affiliates also have the
recourse of preempting network programming in order to protest the network's behavior. 3 5 This strategy
would hurt the network because it
would lose patches of viewers to
other networks when the affiliates
cancelled their programs. However,
the preemption strategy is not advisable because the affiliates would
weaken themselves in the process.
Preemption would place the network
in the uncomfortable position of losing viewers, but the affiliates would
also be harmed by their decreased
audience. Furthermore, the affiliates cannot preempt as a group
because that strategy may constitute
an antitrust violation. 36 Even if the
affiliates decided on a station-by-station basis to preempt, they are still
at risk because, arguably, their
actions could still amount to a collusive effort to control dissemination of
Thus, the
network programming.
risks involved in punitive preemption outweigh any benefit.

ARGUMENTS AND REMEDIES
The affiliates seek to prevent the
rebroadcasting of network programming on cable because they fear an
erosion of viewership and a loss of
Kenneth
revenue.
advertising
Elkins, Chairman of NBC Affiliates
and a member of Pulitzer Broadcasting, describes this tension when he
"see [s] MSNBC as being a competitor

Gary Chapman,
[to affiliates]."'3 7
President of NBC affiliate LIN
Television, criticizes rebroadcasting
because it causes networks to "cannibaliz[e] [their affiliates and, as a
result, the affiliates] have the biggest
audience defection [to cable networks]. '"38
Whether through negotiation or
litigation, the affiliates' first priority
is to stop network rebroadcasting.
The networks may offer to pay off the
affiliates to continue this practice,
but financial inducements will not
offset the long-term losses that affiliates will experience as a result of
viewer dilution. If the negotiations
fail, the affiliates may be forced to
threaten litigation. If so, they will
marshal three arguments. First, the
cable rebroadcasts violate the exclusivity clauses of the network-affiliate
Second, rebroadcasting
contracts.
breaches the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Finally,
the affiliates may argue that the network's actions violate the Cable Act
of 1992 ("Cable Act" or "the Act"),
which prohibits cable rebroadcast of
network programming without consent of the affiliates.
The networks can counter each
claim. First, the exclusivity clauses
may be too broad to apply in the present controversy. Second, the network can deny that the rebroadcasts
demonstrably harm the affiliates,
and, in the absence of injury, no
implied covenant has been breached.
Finally, the network will contend that
the rebroadcast restrictions of the
Cable Act do not apply because
Congress did not anticipate this specific controversy in enacting that legislation.

THE LONG SHADOW
OF LITIGATION
There are two viable alternatives
for the affiliates: accept a cash settlement or attempt to obtain some

rebroadcast protection from the netRegardless of whether the
work.
parties are in negotiation or in litigation, the same legal issues will pervade the debate because the affiliates
may need the threat of litigation to
loom over negotiations if the affiliates
are to procure a favorable settlement.
Network-affiliate disputes often
are settled through negotiations. In
this dispute, the network might offer
the affiliates a cash settlement to
assuage their fears of lost revenue.
This would not be in the long-term
interests of the affiliates because it
does not solve the affiliates' exclusivity problem, as exclusivity is the lifeblood of affiliates. Discussing exclusivity in the context of program
duplication in KCST-TV v. FCC, the
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia noted that, without exclusive rights to programs, "a [broadcast] station's audience would be
which would diminish the
diluted ...
station's advertising revenues and

Accepting cash and addressing
future network-affiliate issues as
they arise is not in the affiliates' best
interests. Instead, they should mobilize and insist on protection from the
network to assure that at least their
immediate future is secure. Such a
resolution, however, may require litigation as leverage.
Affiliates and networks rarely litiAs former NBC President
gate.
Michael Gartner notes, "I doubt any
litigation will occur [between the networks and the affiliates]. ... Nobody
usually goes to court in these situations because the stakes are too
high. '4 0 Jim Waterbury of KWWL in
Waterloo, Iowa is more open to the
possibility of litigation but adds that
even though "litigation is not impos41
sible ... it is a long way down the road."

flowing from a lawsuit endangers
goodwill with viewers and advertisers. Indeed, as Waterbury observes,
"The networks fear bad press and
bad publicity even more than the
42
A
actual results of litigation."
threat of litigation could help the
affiliates bargain for limited rebroadcasting in the future.
The new, longer affiliate agreements also encourage litigation. If
the agreements only ran two years,
an injunction would be impractical;
the contract likely would have
expired by the time the issue was
adjudicated. But the new, longer
affiliation agreements first arose in

Though the affiliates' role in the
broadcasting industry is not strong
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enough to obtain a favorable settlement up front from the networks, litigation or its threat may tip the
scales. If the affiliates' case is initially successful, it could induce the
networks to concede more than payments to the affiliates. The threat of
litigation itself places pressure on
the networks because bad publicity

which might threaten the quality of
the station's programming or the
39
very survival of the station."
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1995, just before the creation of modern network cable in 1996. Thus,
these agreements still have significant life, which could make pursuit
of an injunction a worthwhile goal.
Still, the prospect of long and bitter
litigation against a business partner
may be against the best interests of
the affiliates, despite their long-term
agreements.
The networks, however, also have
an incentive to litigate, at least to a
preliminary stage. In fact, the network may be best served by initiating the suit. The affiliates could
bring a number of different suits in
different jurisdictions, which
would be difficult and costly
to defend.
The network
could sue in New York or
California, depending upon
where it is headquartered, I
seeking a declaratory judg-_
ment against all its affiliates. This preemptive move
would consolidate the suit
and place it in a court that
might be more sympathetic
to large commercial organizations.
Consolidation
would make prosecution of the suit
more efficient. Moreover, such a proactive stroke would reassure network stockholders, who would be
alarmed by a highly-publicized rash
of suits by individual affiliates across
the country.
While litigation will probably not
be played out to its fruition, it will
affect the bargaining power of the
parties during negotiations.
The
parties' relative bargaining power
will be tied to the strengths and
weakness of their respective legal
positions.
The affiliates cannot
threaten litigation effectively if their
legal claims have no basis. As such,
the viability of the legal contentions
of the affiliates must be examined, as

they are vital to bargaining position
and power.
The Exclusivity Clause
The affiliates' first legal argument
is based on the network-affiliate contract clause that provides the affiliates with exclusive rights to network
programming within their broadcast
areas. The rebroadcast of network programs on network cable arguably
infringes this exclusive contractual right.
Although network-affiliate contracts are not uniform, their exclusivity clauses can generally be classified into two categories. 4 3 The first

Thus, the right of first refusal does
not necessarily include the right to
exclusive programming. Therefore,
affiliates with such an exclusivity
clause would not be able to argue
breach by rebroadcasts.
The second category of exclusivity
clauses is the kind typically granted
by networks. 4 4
This exclusivity
clause is general in its terms, providing that the affiliate will have exclusivity in network programming in
the affiliate's broadcast area.
It
makes no mention of network cable
rebroadcasts. In order to determine
whether this type of clause can be
invoked in this dispute, the
intent of the parties at formation of the contract must
examined.
As noted above, many of
lthe affiliates have been
Lassociated
with their net-

Rbe
ILL

BF

works for 40 or 50 years,
with
periodic
contract
45
renewals.
Over the
years,
the
exclusivity
clause has always granted

type of exclusivity clause is limited to
a right of first refusal on all network
programs offered for the affiliate's
broadcast area. This right grants an
affiliate the ability to be the first television station within a broadcast
area to air the network's programs.
Such a clause, on its own, is probably
not enough to demonstrate an intent
by the parties to prevent network
programs from being rerun on network cable stations. It merely provides that the affiliate has the first
opportunity to air a program; it does
not prevent others from later airing
the same program within the affiliate's broadcast area. This advantage
is distinctly different from the ability
to restrict programming output.

protection to affiliates within their broadcast area.
However, when the clause was first
drafted, there was no threat of cable
stations encroaching on the affiliates'
viewership, and certainly no threat
that the networks would enter the
cable field.
The issue then is
whether the affiliates must specifically point to protection for today's
situation or whether a general clause
of exclusivity is sufficient to protect
the affiliates against all broadcasts
of network programming.
It can be argued that history is no
guide in interpreting the exclusivity
clause. Since the parties have regularly renewed the contracts, the
meaning of the exclusivity clause has
changed as new issues are raised in
subsequent negotiations. Since the

most recent exclusivity clauses do
not mention protection from network
cable, it could be argued that such
silence is deliberate and that the parties elected not to address the cable
issue in their bargaining.
For this latter argument to be persuasive, an affiliate must have been
aware of the network's competing
cable station at the time of renewal.
If on notice, the affiliate must protect
itself when its interests could be
infringed. In a majority of the cases,
however, the affiliate's exclusivity
clause has predated the network's
cable stations. In such cases, the
affiliate could hardly protect itself
against an eventuality that it could
not reasonably foresee.
While the exclusivity clauses of
the 1990s or even the 1980s are not
exactly the same as those granted in
the 1950s, the concept of protection
of programming still pervades the
clauses. Thus, the underlying interests of the affiliates still remain the
same-the affiliates seek insulation
from influences that might weaken
their programming. This overriding
interest is still applicable. If this
general exclusivity clause protects
the affiliate from rebroadcast by
other channels, the same provision
should apply equally to a networkauthorized third party and to the
network itself. The fact that the network may own rights to the programs themselves does not change
the exclusivity issue. Rebroadcasts,
whether they are aired by the network's cable stations or by a local
competitor, equally injure the affiliate.
The general exclusivity clause
should defeat rebroadcasting by the
network cable stations as long as the
affiliate negotiated for such protection while unaware of competition
from the network cable channels like
MSNBC. In future network-affiliate

negotiations, however, affiliates will
have at least constructive knowledge
of this phenomenon and therefore
must require specific protection from
the network. The network might
then select its affiliates based on
whether they are willing to forego
such protection.
However, this potential development does not defuse the threat that
litigation poses to the network. In
this case, an injunction could be costly to the network. Any programming
interruption would put the network
behind its competitors in reaching
viewers. The prospect of five to ten
years' delay in developing a cable
presence is threat enough to make
the network respect any litigation that
has a chance of winning on the merits.
The Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The common law of most states
recognizes that "every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its per'4 6
formance and its enforcement.
Good faith requires that the parties
to a contract not undertake actions
that, although not expressly forbidden by the contract, either effectively
frustrate the purpose of the contract
or destroy or materially impair the
benefits of a contract. 4 7 The covenant
must be shown to be "implicit in the
as a whole." 4 8
agreement ...
Good faith arises out of equitable
principles that require a showing
that the parties' behavior, while not
in breach, emasculates the very purpose for creating the contract and
therefore warrants judicial intervention.4 9 The threshold for enforcing
the implied covenant is quite high.
The harm must be sufficient to obliterate the reason for making the contract and it "could not have been con50
templated at the time of drafting."

The affiliates likely can invoke the
implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in two ways. First, the
existence of network cable broadcast
channels was not foreseeable at the
time that affiliate agreements were
Second, the resultant
negotiated.
harm of rebroadcasting would effectively sabotage affiliate viewership
to such an extent that it threatens
the affiliates' very viability.
The implied covenant protects
only against risks that could not
have been contemplated when the
contract was signed. 5 1 Thus, the
affiliates must establish that they
could not reasonably have anticipated that the networks would rebroadcast their programs on network
cable. This contention is supported
by the fact that network cable did not
exist with its present goals when
many of the affiliate agreements
were signed. CNBC was in existence
at the time these contracts were adopted, but its programming style diverges
significantly from the journalistic
content of the broadcast networks.
The networks have long been
involved in cable, purchasing previously existing cable channels. This
prior involvement arguably placed
the affiliates on notice that network
cable was the next logical step in a
developing industry. In truth, however, the networks themselves did
not realize that rebroadcasts might
be advantageous to their cable channels for many years. 5 2 Therefore,
networks cannot convincingly argue
that the affiliates have been on notice
of an industry development when the
networks themselves entertained no
such plans of expansion until recently. Thus, the affiliates would satisfy
the non-foreseeability requirement of
the implied covenant.
The second requirement of the
implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing is that enforcement of
the contract, in light of the unforeseeable event, would injure the affiliates to such an extent as to defeat
the purpose of the contract. 53 Here,
the affiliates need to demonstrate
that they will suffer a dramatic loss
in viewership, which would not have
occurred had the parties addressed the
cable issue in their contract negotiations.
The extent of future viewership
loss is difficult to prove because what
draws viewers to certain shows and
how to interpret viewership trends
Even
are speculative inquiries. 54
those in the field can merely delineate patterns in viewership but cannot precisely attribute the trends to
any specific cause or event.
James G. Webster, Professor of
Arts
at the
Communica-tions
University of Maryland, bore out the
speculative nature of the endeavor in
his study of audience duplication.
Webster found that there is "no special tendency for viewers of one program to watch another of the same
type.... All readily observable [viewership] patterns seem to be predicted
characteristics
by
scheduling
alone." 5 5 Thus, it is difficult to prove
how many viewers the affiliates might
lose as a result of rebroadcasts.
The issue then becomes whether
the likelihood of such loss constitutes sufficient harm to meet the
standard that the implied covenant
would require.
United Video, Inc. v. FCC
addressed the issue of the likelihood
of harm resulting from loss of programming exclusivity. 5 6 In the case,
cable television companies challenged the FCC's syndicated exclusivity rule. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia found that,
while assessing injury caused by
nonsimultaneous duplication of television shows is "novel and complex,"

the practice harmed the original
source of programming. 5 7 The court
reasoned that the practice of nonsimultaneous duplication of a program
was injurious because "cable companies themselves regularly take
advantage of their ability to obtain
58
exclusive rights in programming."
United Video was not grounded in
a statistical study. Instead, the court
reasoned that since all parties desire
exclusivity, it must have value. But
the fact that all parties desire exclusively does not dictate that exclusivity
is necessarily vital to solid ratings. It
is conceivable that stations desire exclusivity because it might protect them and
not because it conclusively protects
their shows. Thus, United Video might
not control the network-affiliate dispute because the basis of its conclusion could be questioned empirically.
However, the affiliates probably
will prevail on the United Video
rationale because its findings are
Other cases
supported elsewhere.
also have recognized that "without
[exclusivity], serious financial problems ... would befall local television
stations." 5 9
In re Blytheville TV
Cable, an FCC agency hearing, also
accepted this premise despite the
absence of statistical studies. 60 In
both cases, the FCC filed reports concluding that lack of exclusivity
61
injured television stations.
There is still a chance that a network could present statistical evidence
that
United
Video,
Blytheville, and the FCC were in
error. This is not likely to occur
because, to date, no such evidence has
been offered in a case or study to
contradict these judicial conclusions.
Thus, the findings of these courts
indicate a willingness to accept that
loss of exclusivity will cause harm
sufficient to meet the requirement of
the implied covenant.

The Cable Act of 1992
All affiliates, whether or not protected by their exclusivity clause,
may be able to invoke the Cable Act
of 1992 to enjoin the networks from
cable rebroadcasts. Section 325(b) of
the Act contains a provision that prevents cable systems from retransmission of broadcast television signals
without the express authority of the
originating station. 62 The affiliates
could argue that the §325(b) of the
Cable Act supports their case
because network cable rebroadcasts
constitute retransmission on a cable
system without consent. The Act
does prevent rebroadcast of network
programming on cable and, in a general sense, this describes the conduct
of the network cable station. But the
substance of the Act does not support
the affiliates' argument.
First, §325(b) does not prohibit the
networks but rather "cable systems"
from retransmitting a broadcast television signal. The affiliates here are
suing the network and its cable channel, not the cable systems that carry
the channel. But this problem can be
avoided by suing the cable systems
themselves. For convenience, this
discussion will only refer to the networks as the defendants in this section but it should be understood that
the cable systems would be joined.
The more formidable textual
problem for the affiliates to overcome is whether the cable system is
actually "retransmitting" the broadcast channel's "signal." Here, the
complaint is that the network cable
channels rebroadcast shows that
have already been seen on the affiliates' stations. The network cable
channel does not rebroadcast the
affiliates' actual signals, however,
but rather the programming that
was once on that signal. As such, the
network's actions are most likely out-
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This
various copyright holders."
side the scope of §325(b).
Even though the text does not sup- statement still does not separate clearport the affiliates, the intent of the ly the broadcast rights of affiliates
Act may. Through the Cable Act, from those of the networks.
Such a divergence of interests is
Congress sought to prevent cable
systems from using their monopolis- the essence of the present dispute,
tic status to unfairly treat customers and its absence in the Act strongly
63
suggests that the statute does not
The Act
and television stations.
explicitly stated that it intended to apply to this case. Because the Act
protect customers from unfair rates does not specifically or implicitly
and to prevent the systems from con- anticipate the present controversy,
trolling what television channels nor even recognize the possibility
could carry. 64 Accordingly, the Act that the network and its affiliates do
mandated retransmission consent. not share the same interests, the
Congress found that most viewers Cable Act cannot be invoked to presubscribed to cable because of the vent network cable rebroadcasts.
availability of broadcast network tel-

evision. 65 The Act created retransmission consent so that the cable systems could not retransmit as a "free
rider," thereby benefiting
from added network view

Injunctive Relief and Sufficient Harm
The affiliates have a reasonable
likelihood of success on their claims

ers without compensating
the broadcast stations.
Unsurprisingly, the Act
contains no mention of this
particular type of networkaffiliate dispute. The Act
was passed in 1992 and
modern network cable did
not begin until 1996.
Furthermore, the Act cannot be cited by analogy. Nowhere
does it distinguish the interests of
the network and from those of its
affiliates. The closest the Act comes
to recognizing separate rights in
broadcast signals is found in its legislative history. In the hearings of
on
Subcom-mitte
House
the
Telecommunications and Finance,
the President of the National
Association of Broadcasters, Edward
Fritts, noted that "there are two
interests intertwined in a broadcast
signal-the interest in the signal
which belongs to the broadcaster,
and the interest in the programs carried on that signal which belongs to

has never been addressed by a court.
However, the injunction is more
valuable as a bargaining chip in
negotiation than as a satisfactory
resolution in court. Accordingly, the
likelihood of an injunction matters
more than its scope. If in the course
of the litigation, the network concludes that the affiliates have a reasonable chance at obtaining an injunction, it will be more inclined to negotiate.
Under California and New York
law, the likely jurisdictions of such
disputes, injunctive relief is granted
where a party proves "a likelihood of
substantial and immediate irreparable injury" and the "party's legal
7
remedies are inadequate." 6 In addition, the court "balances the conveniences of the parties and possible
injuries to them according as
they may be affected by the
The court
injunction." 68
particular
"pay
also
must

T

of exclusivity and the implied
covenant of good faith. Although the
litigation may not reach the point of
imposing a remedy, it is still necessary to consider the probability that
the affiliates can obtain an injunction. The affiliates will draw no bargaining power from the threat of litigation unless they could obtain an injunction as a result of their claims.
Otherwise, the network has no reason
to fear litigation.
Analysis of injunction is difficult
in this case. Not only does it require
speculation to a future point in the
litigation, but this issue presents a
novel and complex controversy that

regard for the public consequences in employing the
extraordinary remedy of
injunction."6 9
Injunctive relief is appro-

priate when a party will sufharm. 70
irreparable
fer
Injunctions are granted only
upon proof that damages are inadequate. 71 This analysis of sufficient
harm is the same as under the
On one hand,
implied covenant.
Blvtheville, United Video, and the
FCC all found that loss of exclusivity
will damage affiliates. On the other
hand, these findings are not necessarily conclusive because they lacked
However,
statistical grounding.
United Video and the FCC conclusions would raise a significant possibility that a court would grant an
injunction to the affiliates. This
possibility is reason enough for the
affiliates to threaten litigation during negotiations.

Another factor to be weighed in
granting an injunction is the burden
on the enjoined party. 72 Again, since
harm has yet to occur, it is difficult to
balance injury between the parties.
But, as recognized in United Video,
In re Blytheville, and the FCC's findings, the affiliates could be severely
73
harmed by the rebroadcasts.
Conversely, since the network
rebroadcasts have been isolated until
now, it is difficult to argue that they
have become integral parts of network cable programming. Thus, the
affiliates have a viable argument that
the balance of harm is in their favor.

Public Policy Implications
Public policy may be considered in
deciding whether or not to grant an
injunction. 74 Home Box Office, Inc.
v. FCC dealt with public policy implications involved in television exclusive rights cases. 75 In that case, a
cable company sought review of FCC
limits on programming fares for pay
cable channels.
The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
recognized that "as a matter of policy
further restrictions should not be
placed on the [cable television]
industry."7 6 The court's rationale for
this policy was that restrictions on
cable programming were "contrary to
the public interest" because they did
not "promote diversity of programs
77
and sources" on cable television.
In accordance with this policy, the
networks could argue that restricting
its cable output will reduce program
diversity on cable.
However, this argument is not
likely to succeed because it frames
programming solely in the context of
cable television. It is true that the
rebroadcasting does add new shows
to cable television. However, in the
scheme of television as a whole, the
programs do not truly increase diver-

sity because the rebroadcasted shows
are already available, for free, on the
affiliates' stations. In fact, public
policy would dictate that network
cable has an obligation to offer programming that is truly diverse, not
merely rerun what is already available
to viewers. Thus, public policy would
probably favor granting an injunction.
It is only necessary at this point to
inquire whether the affiliates have a
remedy that will make their threat of
litigation potent.
In the case of
rebroadcasts, quantifying harm,
assessing damages, and balancing
injury are all difficult when harm
has not occurred and the issue is new
to the industry. However, the affiliates only need to demonstrate that
their chance of winning in court
makes negotiating out of court
worthwhile for the networks. The
possibility of injunction in this case
will encourage the networks to settle.
Additionally, when the networks'
risk of losing in court is combined
with the negative publicity that litigation will generate, the networks
have great incentive to settle the controversy and concede meaningful
protection to the affiliates.
Despite the fact that the affiliates
might succeed at trial, any victory
would maintain the status quo only
until their old agreements expire. At
that time, the networks would renegotiate for the right to rebroadcast
through their own cable stations. If,
on the contrary, the affiliates settled
early to receive some protection from
network-owned cable rebroadcasts,
such protection could become part of
the canon of affiliate agreements.
This negotiated protection could set
the terms for the future and allow
the affiliates to redefine themselves
at least as primary, as opposed to
sole, providers of network programming. Even if technology proves that

affiliates have become obsolete in an
era of viewer-tailored content, the
protection could at least slow the
affiliates' extinction.

SUBSCRIBING TO THE
SUPER BOWL?
Despite the possible precedent of
the Cable Act, Congress is unlikely to
step in to resolve this dispute. Any
intervention would be premised on
the assumption that weak affiliates
result in more programs on cable,
thus restricting the range of programs for a significant number of
viewers. Dave Keneipp, FOX Vice
President of Legal Affairs, notes that
if popular events such as the Super
Bowl were aired on cable, "Congress
would have something to say
[because its airing outside of broadcast cable makes it] inaccessible to
35 percent of the country." 78 Indeed,
Congress might act on the grounds
that preventing a large number of
viewers from watching a diversity of
programming is against public policy.
However, Congressional action is
premature at this point. Neither the
Super Bowl nor any other nationally
significant programming has been
aired outside of broadcast television.
Furthermore, for 50 years, networks
and affiliates have been able to negotiate sufficiently fair agreements
through all the changes in the marketplace. Absent proof otherwise,
there is no reason to think that they
will not be able to negotiate in the
future. Even if the affiliates are in
an inferior bargaining position,
Congress may not deem them a party
worth protecting. Indeed, if the affiliates are, in fact, destined for extinction like eight-track tapes and
Betamax players, there would be no
public interest in granting them
Congressional protection.
Experts remain divided on the

question of whether affiliates will be
necessary to the process of spreading
network shows to the public in the
Michelle Dube of WKRN
future.
networks will utilize
that
states
cable over affiliates "within five
years-if not sooner."' 79 In contrast,
in their article on the future of television, professors of communication
James R. Walker of Saint Xavier
University and Douglas A. Ferguson
of Bowling Green State University,
write that "it is difficult to see a near
future without. ... broadcast television. ... [T]he wide coverage and low
direct costs to consumers make it too
attractive [to viewers]." 8 0 However,
even Walker and Ferguson concede
that "[broadcast television] will
never return to the secure, insular
81
competition of its first generation.
It seems that the question is not
whether broadcast television will be
eclipsed by cable television, but
rather when and to what extent.
Dave Keneipp predicts that "overthe-air [affiliates may] just become
another version of cable in the sense
Jim
of specialty channels. '8 2
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